Factors Affecting Risk-Adjusted Stock Market Returns in Emerging Markets: A Pre- and Post-Crisis Comparison by Castro, Javier & Whittall, Patrick
  
 
Factors Affecting Risk-Adjusted Stock Market Returns in 
Emerging Markets: A Pre- and Post-Crisis Comparison 
 
By Patrick Whittall and Javier Castro 
 
24
th
 May 2017 
 
Lund University Master’s in Finance 
Supervisor: Emre Aylar 
Abstract 
Emerging markets have shown higher average returns alongside higher volatility.  This has 
attracted investors around the globe who see these markets as a precious alternative to developed 
ones, as has become clear in the aftermath of the financial crisis.  Hence, we consider it logical 
that more emphasis be put on investigating not only stock market returns in these developing 
economies, but also their relationship with risk.  In this paper, we investigate the explanatory 
power of various macro and microeconomic variables on risk-adjusted returns, measured by the 
Sharpe ratio.  Our results suggest that a number of variables, macro and micro, have statistical 
power in at least one of our periods.  We are particularly interested in the effect of the increase in 
capital flows to emerging markets on their equity markets.  For this reason, focus is placed on the 
change in the explanatory power of our model when applied to the pre- vs. post-crisis periods.  
We find that the model is significantly better when applied to the post-crisis period with a more 
important role played by the exchange rate at the expense of the other variables.   
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1. Introduction 
 
The 2007/08 global financial crisis had a widespread and damaging effect on the world’s 
economies and financial markets.  Many would argue that the effect of this turmoil was not only 
restricted to the crisis period but, in various ways, has fundamentally changed global financial 
markets and the way that they interact with each other permanently.  The repercussions of this 
financial crisis lead to substantial differences between the developed and developing economies, 
which many investors have tried to take advantage of.  The introduction of further regulation and 
the stimulus packages enacted by the central banks of the developed countries have sparked a 
trend of investors moving their money to emerging markets in search of higher returns.  As a 
result, these fundamental changes may have affected how economic variables relate to financial 
factors, such as stock returns and their riskiness.  Therefore, what we believe to be an interesting 
and worthwhile opportunity for meaningful investigation arises. 
 
  We have two main motivations for producing this paper: firstly, to investigate whether both 
macroeconomic and microeconomic factors have an effect on risk-adjusted returns in emerging 
markets as a whole; and secondly, how some of these relationships, if any, have evolved after the 
recent changes in global financial markets.  Particularly, we focus on the model as a whole and 
how the explanatory power changes when comparing pre- and post-crisis subsets.  Many previous 
studies have investigated the relationship between equity returns and macroeconomic and 
microeconomic factors either with official data or surveys, but most of them focus mainly on 
developed economies.  Some more recent studies have begun to analyse the influence of these 
variables on equity returns in emerging markets, but the amount of literature is still small and 
primarily focuses on single countries and on only macro or microeconomic factors separately.   
Few studies have taken such a broad view of this topic, the most common formula is to study a 
single market and focus on macroeconomic variables, rather than a mix (Singh et al, 2011; Akbar 
et al 2012; Acikalin et al 2008 etc.).  However, as Bilson et al. (2001) observe, when micro 
variables such as price-to-earnings and dividend yield are added, the explanatory power of the 
model is significantly increased.  To our knowledge, of those articles which do take a broader 
view of this area, none have focussed on the risk-adjusted returns in emerging markets. 
 
The conclusions drawn up to now from these investigations are that in developed economies, 
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returns are affected, at least to an extent, by a number of variables, both macro and micro in 
nature.  Nonetheless, these relationships do not seem to be completely clear in the emerging 
economies as they differ by country, and some studies have failed to find, or found very low 
levels of significance for particular variables, for example in Bilson et al. (2001). 
 
Emerging markets are becoming ever more relevant on the world financial stage.  Indeed, as 
Kearney (2012) outlines, emerging markets do not only consistently grow at a faster rate than 
their developed counterparts; they also contain the majority of the human capital in the world, 
and so their potential is vast.  As a result, international investors have become increasingly 
interested in the opportunities available in emerging markets.  However, due to the lack of data 
available, their lower liquidity and less importance in the global context when compared to 
developed economies, emerging markets have been somewhat neglected in the academic world 
until now.  The current situation, created by both the recently-increasing attractiveness of 
emerging markets to global investors, and by the unique characteristics that differentiate 
emerging economies from the rest of the world is very interesting.  Due to this and the fact that 
relevant data of increasing quality is becoming more widely available, we believe that it is 
important to further investigate how these markets behave. In particular, we shall investigate 
whether their relationships with the main factors explaining their behaviour have changed 
significantly since the global financial crisis, given the major global upheavals that have 
occurred. 
 
As Schmukler (2008) observes, since the 1970s, not only have emerging markets experienced 
dramatic increases in the level of capital inflows into their countries, but also the composition of 
these flows has transitioned to become more geared towards private capital flows.  Through this 
transition, while private capital flows became the dominant source of capital inflow for many 
emerging economies, the relative size of official flows fell to less than half.  Schmukler goes on 
to recognise the international investors and financial institutions as driving factors of this 
financial globalisation. He illustrates graphically the ‘internationalisation of emerging stock 
markets’ (Schmukler 2008, p. 54), showing a huge increase in the level of equity capital raised in 
developed markets, destined for emerging markets during the 1990s.  Ahmed and Zlate (2013) 
highlight the dramatic increase in the cumulative net-inflows of portfolio investment into the 
emerging economies since the crisis.  This figure fell from ~$50bn. in end-2007 to roughly -
$20bn in early 2009 and rose to more than $400bn. in end-2012, as a result of a higher sensitivity 
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to the policy rate differential between emerging markets and the USA. These findings are 
particularly relevant as we predict capital flows into our countries of interest to be highly 
correlated with the performance of their respective stock markets. This is because more money 
invested would drive prices up, and the fact that private capital flows increased over these years 
supports the view that international investors are increasingly interested in emerging markets. 
 
In this paper, we take an overall view of and investigate both macro and microeconomic 
factors which affect risk-adjusted stock market returns in various emerging markets.  We define 
‘emerging market’ according to the FTSE Russell Annual Country Classification as of September 
2016 and March 2017.  In our approach, we develop a multifactor model using a panel data set of 
19 different countries across 16 years.  We take the Sharpe ratio of the country index stock 
market as the dependent variable, for which we use the 3-month Treasury bill. If this is 
unavailable, we take an equivalent measure as a proxy of the risk-free interest rate and the sample 
standard deviation of the stock index returns in the period chosen.  As for the explanatory 
variables, we use the world market returns - proxied by the MSCI World Index-, the industrial 
production index - a measure of the real activity-, money supply, the consumer price index - a 
measure of the good prices-, momentum, dividend yield and the price-to-earnings ratio.  We 
conduct our analysis on three datasets, the first being for the entire period (2000-2016) and the 
subsequent two being pre- and post-crisis, with the break defined at October 2007, as in Berrill & 
Kearny (2011).  Our results show that both macroeconomic and microeconomic variables, except 
momentum, have had a statistically significant effect on risk-adjusted returns for the period 
spanning September 2000 to September 2016.  In addition to this, we find significant differences 
between our pre-crisis and post-crisis models which show that the exchange rate has become a 
key variable in explaining the risk-adjusted returns after the crisis period.  This supports our 
theory that emerging markets are now, more than ever, driven by international capital flows.  
What is more, we find a highly significant difference in how the pre-crisis and post-crisis 
regressions predict risk-adjusted returns, with them becoming more predictable after the 2007/08 
crisis. 
 
We recognise that there are also some limitations in our analysis that can be addressed in 
further research.  Using a (G)ARCH model to estimate volatility instead of a rolling 36-month 
standard deviation may be a better approach.  However, using a (G)ARCH model introduces a 
considerable amount of noise in the estimate since volatility is unobservable.  The relationships 
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between the independent variables and the risk-adjusted returns may vary by country depending 
on numerous country-specific characteristics including the degree of involvement in international 
markets. This may not be expressly shown in our panel data regression as it assumes 
homogeneous slopes across markets.  Some readers may also criticise the use of the dividend 
yield and price-to-earnings ratio in levels, as it may give rise to endogeneity issues.  As a matter 
of fact, we believe that these variables in levels are more likely to affect risk-adjusted returns 
since investors base their decisions on how large/small they are and not on their change.  
Nonetheless, further investigation can be carried out by using instrumental variables to measure 
their effect.  Furthermore, as Harvey (1995) points out, there may be an upward bias in the 
indices; while they are not constructed according to the historical performance of the stocks or 
their expected future performance, the size and liquidity of the companies’ stocks do influence 
their presence on the index and may reveal information about the stock past performance.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows.  Section 2 discusses the previous relevant 
literature concerning this topic.  Section 3 covers the details of the data used in our analysis.  
Section 4 explains our methodology.  Section 5 presents our main findings obtained and, finally, 
section 6 concludes the paper.  
2. Literature Review 
 
Literature about the effect of macro and microeconomic variables on risk-adjusted returns in 
emerging markets is, to our knowledge, non-existent at the moment.  Most studies include risk 
measures on the right-hand side of the equation but none have ever investigated the effect of the 
mentioned variables on a risk-adjusted measure such as the Sharpe ratio.  It is important to note 
that throughout this paper, because of the lack of research in this area specifically (on risk-
adjusted returns as opposed to returns), when we make comparisons with results of previous 
literature, we are comparing with results based on unadjusted returns. 
 
We will now provide a brief historical background on the development of the Sharpe ratio 
(SR) alongside technical explanation of the ratio itself.  William Sharpe coined the term ‘reward-
to-variability’ (R/V) for a measure which he derived in his seminal work “Mutual Fund 
Performance” (Sharpe, 1966), conclusions from which much of this section refers to.  The 
measure which was henceforth known as the ‘Sharpe measure’ or ‘Sharpe ratio’ has had huge 
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influence and been used and comprehensively studied ever since.  The derivation of the Sharpe 
ratio was made possible by the development of the Capital Asset Pricing Model in the 1960’s, for 
example in Sharpe’s own work on capital asset prices in the presence of risk (Sharpe, 1964).  It is 
largely accepted that the works in the 1960s on the capital asset pricing model from various 
academics (Lintner, 1965; Sharpe, 1964) etc. lend from the influences of Markowitz’s (1952) 
ground-breaking paper, “Portfolio Selection” which laid the foundations for such further studies. 
 
The R/V ratio first appeared as a measure of the performance of mutual funds but, as can 
clearly be seen, is useful in multiple similar applications.  The form in which the ratio first 
appeared in 1966 was as below: 
A = p + [
Ai − p
Vi
] V 
 
Where Ai and Vi represent the average annual rate of return and the standard deviation of the 
annual rate of return respectively, for each mutual fund, and p represents the risk-free rate.  The 
term in brackets is what Sharpe defined as the “R/V ratio” and measures excess return above the 
risk free rate per unit of variability – essentially the reward for bearing risk.  It follows that the 
higher the value of the R/V ratio, henceforth known as the Sharpe Ratio or SR, the better the 
performance of the mutual fund. 
 
Sharpe notes his ratio is highly correlated with the Treynor index (TI) when both are 
calculated for a sample of mutual funds.  The Treynor index (Treynor, 1965) can be represented 
in Sharpe’s notation mathematically as follows, 
TI =  
Ai − p
Bi
 
 
As becomes apparent upon comparison of the two measures, this high level of correlation is 
to be expected as the denominator in the TI is the mutual fund’s portfolio beta value, which is 
also a measure of risk.  Whilst the denominator in the SR is the standard deviation of returns 
which are highly correlated, and, of course, the numerators representing the risk premium are 
identical.  The higher the proportion of total variability which is made up by volatility, the more 
aligned the two measures become and the more similar their respective rankings of mutual funds 
become.  Indeed, the TI is a widely used alternative to the SR.  The most notable factor which 
steered us towards conducting our research using the SR instead of the TI is that the TI has 
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difficulty in capturing the component of variability caused by a lack of diversification.  In this 
case, Sharpe notes that the measures begin to differ increasingly and so the SR will outperform 
the TI with respect to past performance and vice versa (Sharpe, 1966). 
 
Fama and French (1989) was one of the first outstanding papers showing that both stock and 
corporate bonds excess returns are possible to predict with some financial variables such as the 
dividend yield, the term spread and the default spread.  By using time-series analysis on U.S. data 
from 1927 to 1987 and from 1941 to 1987 (post Great Depression), they found that the dividend 
yield has a positive and significant effect on monthly, quarterly and one- to four-year returns, for 
the period excluding the Great Depression.  Interestingly, when applying the same method on 
whole-period sample, the coefficients for monthly and quarterly returns turn out not to be 
significant but are still positive.  According to Fama and French, the regression for both periods 
tell a similar story, nonetheless, the regression R-squared and the t-statistics for the slopes 
illustrate that the forecast power of the three variables is stronger and more reliable for the post-
Great Depression period.  In our opinion, this is a fascinating finding since it shows that returns 
become more unpredictable during crisis periods in which volatility tends to be quite high.  
Consequently, it reinforces the idea that our sample should be split not only to account for the 
capital flows upheaval in the emerging markets, but also for the rare behaviour of stock returns 
during crisis periods.  One story which explains these results is that expected returns tend to be 
higher when business conditions are poor and income low in order to induce investors to 
substitute consumption for investment, and vice versa (Fama and French, 1989).  Furthermore, 
they state another hypothesis for these results: that the dividend yield, term spread and default 
spread are proxies for risk that take higher values when the state of the economy is poor and 
lower when it is good. 
 
In a similar fashion, Bilson et al. (2001) used a time-series approach with a least-square 
procedure: using US–dollar-denominated monthly returns as the dependent variable and five 
macroeconomic series as explanatory variables (world market, money supply, goods prices, real 
activity and the national currency exchange rate against the US dollar) on 20 different emerging 
markets (of which 13 are also used in this paper) from February 1985 to December 1997.  Their 
findings show that only the exchange rate seems to have a strong negative effect on the stock 
returns of emerging markets, which is coherent with the international investor’s point of view that 
they take in their work.  Furthermore, they find that the world index only has a significant 
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(positive) effect on 10 countries of the 20 analysed, indicating that increases in world market 
returns may lead to higher returns in these economies.  The money supply is only significant in 6 
countries and mainly with a positive sign whereas the real activity and the goods prices have each 
an effect only in one market.  With regards to the explanatory power of the models, the adjusted 
R
2
 ranges between -0.01 to 0.38 in Indonesia.  Although there is relatively poor performance of 
these variables in Bilson et al.’s (2001) work, we include them all again in our paper for two 
reasons: 1) The explanatory power of these macroeconomic variables may well have changed 
over the last decade, 2) the effect of these variables may be different on risk-adjusted returns than 
on returns. 
 
Many papers have focussed their analyses on the effect of the real activity, often proxied by 
GDP or industrial production.  There is strong evidence in the literature that the growth in GDP 
positively affects stock market returns, and this same literature is also present in the case of 
emerging market focusses.  This result is found by Singh et al (2011) for Taiwan through linear 
regression analysis of multiple annual portfolio returns while Wongbangpo and Sharma (2002) 
find the same in the long run for Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Philippines and Indonesia, using 
monthly data from 1985-1996.  With quarterly observations, through the use of cointegration 
tests, a VECM and causality tests, Acikalin et al. (2008) find long term and stable relationships 
between the returns of the Istanbul Stock Exchange and, once again, GDP, along with interest 
rates, exchange rates and the current account balance.  They conclude that in this case “stock 
price variability is fundamentally linked to the changes in macroeconomic variables” (Acikalin et 
al., 2008, p.14) and note the importance of shocks in global macroeconomic variables to stocks to 
emerging markets. 
 
As for research which take broader approach, Al-Jafari et al. (2011) analyse the impacts of 
macroeconomic factors on the stock prices of both 16 developed and 16 emerging markets 
between January 2002 and December 2008 using monthly data.  Their analysis reveals that the 
emerging economies exhibit higher volatility in the stock market index, industrial production and 
money supply, compared to the developed markets. This reinforces our belief of the importance 
of using risk-adjusted returns, as opposed to solely excess returns.  Evidence is found for a bi-
directional relationship between stock markets and real economic activity, which is significant for 
emerging markets, but only in the short run.  Similarly, in the short run there was a two-way 
relationship found between inflation and stock prices for emerging markets.  Again, an 
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exclusively short run, unidirectional relationship was found from stock prices to interest rates 
while a short run, two-way, relationship is observed between stock prices and exchange rates.  
Also, a relationship in the short run moving from stock prices to money supply was found.  A 
final conclusion is drawn through this analysis that macroeconomic variables are related in a 
much stronger way to the stock prices in emerging markets than those of their developed 
counterparts.  All of these results are relevant to our work as, in one way or another, these 
variables are components of our model.  Money supply, exchange rate, industrial production and 
inflation are directly included and interest rates are technically a component of our Sharpe Ratio, 
with the risk premium, E(R)-Rf as the numerator where Rf is the risk free rate. 
 
As opposed to the findings discussed above, Goetzmann et al. (2012) find a negative, 
significant relationship between the semi-annual, two-step-ahead forecast GDP extracted from 
the Livingston Survey and excess returns in the U.S. between 1953S1 and 2008S2.  This is 
interesting because, as opposed to the papers mentioned, they argue that we should expect a 
negative relationship between the real activity and the stock market since a large equity premium 
arises when the state of the economy is bad.  Furthermore, they state that better economic 
conditions increase investors’ consumption and decrease marginal utility, which leads to this 
negative relationship.  In this same vein, Campbell and Diebold (2009) also find a negative and 
significant coefficient of -0.20 between the semi-annual, two-step-ahead forecast GDP from the 
Livingston Survey and the semi-annual, excess returns between 1952S1 and 2003S2.  What is 
more, they find that including the business expectations in the regression reduces the coefficient 
and t-statistic of other predictors like the dividend yield while increasing the R-squared of the 
model by more than fifty percent. 
 
As mentioned, Fama and French (1989) also argue that, under good economic conditions and 
high income, the market clears at lower levels of expected returns.  According to Campbell and 
Diebold, business expectations and equity markets are linked through investors’ time-varying 
risk.  Hence, these findings contradict other previous literature and cast some doubt on what 
results we should expect from the real activity coefficient –in our case, proxied by the industrial 
production-.  Obviously, better economic conditions lead to higher cash flows for businesses and, 
therefore, a positive relationship should be found.  Conversely, if, as suggested by Goetzmann et 
al. (2010) and Campbell and Diebold (2009), today’s investors’ expectations influence 
tomorrow’s price, which sounds logical to us: we would expect investors to anticipate actual 
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economic conditions and buy stocks today when the economy is expected to improve.  Thus, we 
should observe a negative relationship between the current industrial production data and the 
excess returns.  Having said this, it is important to remember that we are not using excess returns 
in our analysis, but risk-adjusted returns so, if the relationship between the business expectations 
and the stock market was actually due to the time-varying risk, it will be interesting to see how 
this affects our results as we are already including a time-varying risk measure in our dependent 
variable. 
 
Concerning the effect of macroeconomic and microeconomic factors on the returns volatility:  
Engle and Rangel (2008) analyse a sample comprised of both developed and developing 
countries from 1990 to 2003.  They find that the long-term volatilities of some macroeconomics 
variables (such as GDP and interest rates) are the main causes of low-frequency market volatility.  
Countries with high rates of inflation and low levels of real growth tend to have higher volatility 
in their equity markets; however, they outline that this result is very sensitive to the inclusion of 
Argentina in the analysis due to its high level of inflation and low real growth.  Furthermore, their 
results show the effect on low-frequency volatility of a larger number of listed firms and 
increased relative size of the market with respect to the country´s GDP.  Both of these 
explanatory variables were used as proxies for the amount of diversification opportunities.  They 
argue that this leads to decreased low-frequency volatility, as a possible result of the higher 
market distortions and political instability in emerging markets.  In addition, a positive effect of 
the country’s economy size on volatility is found, which may be caused by larger information 
flows and leverage.  These results are quite relevant for our analysis as they show that 
macroeconomic variables also have an effect on return volatility and, by extension, on risk-
adjusted returns.  Thus, if we observe that real growth rates have a negative effect on excess 
returns and a positive effect on volatility, the effect on risk-adjusted returns will be ambiguous 
and will depend on which factor dominates the other. 
 
Most studies, however, focus on how macroeconomic volatility or shocks in macroeconomic 
variables, rather than the variables themselves, affect stock return volatility.  In this way, Abugri 
(2008) analyses how macroeconomic volatility and stock returns are related in four Latin 
American economies - Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico - between January 1986 and August 
2001 by using time-series analysis with a VAR model.  The findings show that stock return 
volatility tends to be more affected by global economic factors, such as the MSCI World returns 
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and the U.S. 3-month Treasury bill.  However, different results for domestic macroeconomic 
variables, such as the exchange rate, domestic interest rate, industrial production and money 
supply are found across countries.  Likewise, Diebold and Yilmaz (2008) investigate the same 
relationship in a sample of forty countries over varying time periods ranging from the 1960s to 
the 2000s. They find a positive one-way effect of GDP volatility on stock market volatility with a 
panel data regression and a Granger causality test.  This confirms that not only do economic 
variables affect excess returns, but also their volatility; therefore, it supports our use of risk-
adjusted returns as the dependent variable in our analysis as the effect of macroeconomic and 
microeconomic variables can either move this measure in an ambiguous way or have a stronger 
effect on it, in comparison to excess returns. 
 
With regards to capital flows, there is an already substantial and continuously growing body 
of literature which supports the view outlined in our introduction.  Namely, that capital flows into 
emerging markets increased dramatically following the global financial crisis and that emerging 
markets were relatively resilient during the crisis compared with developed economies.  Some 
would argue that this change in preference from holding capital in previously-considered-safe 
havens such as the U.S. to emerging markets was due to the fact that emerging markets faired the 
financial storm better than the developed world.  However, as Didier et al. (2012) explain, 
although emerging markets have progressed in their resilience to crises over the past few decades 
due to increased ability to use countercyclical policies, this does not mean that they have 
surpassed advanced economies in their ability to fend off dips in growth.  They argue that 
emerging markets were hit just as hard by the global financial crisis with respect to dips in 
growth rates.  Yet, these rates were much higher to begin with and, perhaps more importantly, 
recovered to pre-crisis levels more quickly than advanced economies – this may be where their 
attraction lay in the years after the crisis.  Abiad et al. (2015) corroborate this view and add that 
after continued improvement in resilience, the 2000s represent the first decade in which emerging 
markets actually spent more time in expansion than advanced economies. 
   
Similarly, Fratzscher (2012) investigates push and pull factor effects on capital flows into 50 
economies, both emerging and developed, around the crisis.  He observes that cumulative capital 
flows into emerging markets experienced some volatility from August 2007, before a dip 
beginning around the time of the collapse of Bear Stearns in March and Lehman Brothers in 
September of 2008, and then skyrocketing from early 2009.  Meanwhile, cumulative capital 
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flows to advanced economies increased only marginally in this period by comparison.  When 
looking at equity specifically, from August 2007 to early 2009, net portfolio investment into 
emerging markets experienced little change with only slight volatility.  From early 2009, as with 
net flows, equity investment in emerging markets begins to rise dramatically.  In contrast, 
portfolio investment in advanced economies actually steadily falls from 2009, although not 
drastically.  Of course, we are more interested in the portfolio aspect of these flows, which show 
a very clearly defined favour of emerging markets over developed economies in the wake of the 
crisis.  This huge influx of portfolio investment after the crisis reinforces our reasoning for 
splitting the data and examining the subsets. 
 
As Hannan (2017) shows, there are various push and pull factors which affect net capital 
flows to emerging markets.  Notably, the model shows a positive and highly significant 
coefficient of 0.51 on the interest rate differential between emerging markets and the US, 
meaning that a single percentage point increase in the differential increases net flows by 0.51% of 
GDP.  Hannan defines the interest rate differential as both a push and pull factor in this 
case.  This indicates that low interest rates set in order to induce growth in the United States in 
the wake of the global financial crisis caused capital to flow from the US and into emerging 
markets.  This contribution is a component of the huge flows described above. 
3. Data 
 
The use of shorter-term holding periods may cause some issues in our regressions due to the 
potential problem of non-trading days, which would lead to misleading observed correlations 
with respect to the actual ones.  Besides, most of the macroeconomic data are published, at least, 
on a monthly basis; therefore, the use of monthly excess returns is more suitable in order to 
match the frequencies of the data.  Indeed, as Al-Jafari el al. (2011) outline, monthly data avoids 
issues that one might encounter when using quarterly or annual data such as spurious correlation 
whilst retaining the degrees of freedom. 
 
We based our decision of which countries to include on the FTSE Russell Annual Country 
Classification as of September 2016 and March 2017, which includes 52 countries as “Advanced 
Emerging Markets”, “Secondary Emerging Markets” and “Frontier Markets” altogether.  Of 
these, 19 are used  in our work: Five Latin American Countries, Argentina (promoted to Frontier 
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Market from “unclassified” as of March 2017), Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Peru; nine Asian 
countries, China, India, Russia, Malaysia, Taiwan, The Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia and  
Pakistan; and five European countries, Turkey, Czech Republic, Hungary, Greece and Poland. 
 
The stock index data has been obtained from Thomson Reuters Eikon with a sample period 
spanning from March 1997 to March 2017 for all of the countries except Russia, for which no 
data prior September 1997 was found.  The returns are denominated in the local currency, 
calculated at monthly intervals and expressed in continuously compounded form due to its 
statistical benefits. 
 
As for the macroeconomic explanatory variables, we use data on the MSCI World Index as a 
proxy of the world market returns, as it used in other previous papers such as Bilson et al. (2001).  
This data was obtained from Thomson Reuters Eikon from March 1997 to March 2017.  
Industrial production and CPI data are obtained from Global Finance Database and from IMF and 
DataStream for those countries with no information in the former database.  Industrial production 
data is used as a proxy for the real activity.  CPI is used as a proxy for the goods prices and, as 
stated by Global Financial Database, its original source is always the central bank or the national 
institute in charge of compiling the series from the respective country.  The exchange rate series 
between the local currencies of the respective countries against the US dollar are mainly obtained 
from Global Financial Database and Bloomberg Terminal and are the end-of-month quotes in all 
of the cases.  Money supply, represented by the narrow stock of money (M1), was obtained from 
Global Financial Database. The microeconomic variables used are the dividend yield and the 
price-to-earnings ratio, which are also obtained from Global Financial Database. 
 
As has been noted in various academic papers, including Bilson et al. (2001) and Fama and 
French (1995), the selection of the variables for use in models of this type can be seen as 
relatively unsystematic.  There is no consensus on which variables should be either included or 
excluded and it is generally accepted that the exercise of choice and the specific resulting group 
of variables is arbitrary in nature.  It is to be expected that criticism may arise from this process 
regarding the appropriateness of the included regressors.  As a result, we deemed the most 
suitable method to at least partially overcome this issue to be to learn from the successes of 
previous literature and so our model includes those variables which, from our reading, proved to 
be the best fit. 
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Furthermore, it is intuitive that it is not the level of the macroeconomic variables used that 
really affects the risk-adjusted returns, but their growth.  For this reason, the first-log difference is 
taken for the industrial production, the consumer price index, the money supply and the exchange 
rates: 
 
𝛥𝑋𝑖𝑡 = ln(𝑋𝑖𝑡) − ln (𝑋𝑖𝑡−1)) 
 
In order to calculate the Sharpe ratio, we also need the risk-free rate for which the monthly 3-
month Treasury bill from each country is used as a proxy.  Data on this variable was not available 
for some countries, so other short-term interest rates were used instead.  Specifically, the money 
market rate was obtained for Argentina and Peru, the 90-365 day lending rate for Chile, the 
deposit rate for China, Russia and Turkey and the 3-month JIBOR for Indonesia.  All of these 
series were collected from Global Financial Database and IMF.  Since these interest rates are 
annualized, we have divided them by 12 so as to match the frequencies of the index returns and 
the interest rates: 
 
𝑅𝑓 =
𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝑅𝑓
12
 
 
Finally, the proxy for the risk-free rate is subtracted from the stock index returns so as to 
obtain the excess returns and, then, they are divided by a rolling 36-month standard deviation for 
the whole period starting in September 1997 to come up with the Sharpe Ratio, as defined in the 
literature review. 
 
Summary statistics of the data are shown in the Table 3 of the appendix, where we want to 
highlight the large difference between the average pre-crisis and post-crisis Sharpe ratio of 0.159 
and -0.067, respectively. Although this difference may be due to the inclusion of the crisis period 
in the post-crisis sample, we observe similar results after removing the worst-crisis months (2008 
and the beginning of 2009), which leads us to think that risk-adjusted returns have suffered a 
dramatic deterioration in the aftermath of the crisis.  In order to shed some light on this issue, we 
show the summary statistics of the monthly returns, monthly short-term interest rates and the 
rolling 36-month standard deviation in Table 4.  We can observe that the fall in the mean of the 
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post-crisis Sharpe ratio is the result of a larger decrease in the mean of the post-crisis returns than 
in the mean of the interest rates; while the standard deviation also goes down.  These figures may 
be affected by the presence of outliers such as Greece in the post-crisis, which shows an average 
Sharpe ratio of -0.28 in our post-crisis subset.  It is also remarkable that, although we observe 
lower average returns in the post-crisis sample (including all the biases mentioned above), we are 
more interested in whether the higher amounts of capital inflows have made the risk-adjusted 
returns more explainable, not whether they have increased overall risk-adjusted returns. 
 
Regarding the suitability of the data, we have run various tests to check how reliably it will 
perform in our model.  Firstly, we have generated a correlation matrix to observe whether we 
have any indication of multicollinearity, the results can be found in Table 5 in the appendix.  As 
we can see there is no indication of a multicollinearity issue and the highest correlation 
coefficient is 0.5554 which is between world returns and country-specific returns, this is not too 
high and in any case relatively high correlation here is to be expected and is not a concern to us.  
Furthermore, the potential presence of unit roots is examined by using a panel data Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller test
1
 (ADF).  The optimum lag length is selected according to the Akaike Info 
Criterion for all of our variables in order to make sure that they are all stationary and so will 
produce sensible results in our models, with the results shown in Table 6.   In this test, our null 
hypothesis is the existence of a unit root in the variable at hand.  As is apparent, we have no 
problem with unit roots in any of our variables since we always reject this null hypothesis at a 1% 
level. 
 
As mentioned in Harvey (1995), a prevalent issue when dealing with index returns, especially 
in emerging markets, is that we could encounter survivorship bias and there are two main causes 
of this.  The first one is that there are more than 50 emerging and frontier economies as shown by 
the FTSE Russell Annual Country Classification and mentioned at the beginning of this section; 
however, we are only including 19 of them in our analysis based on the availability of data and 
on our judgment.  We are aware of the potential upward (downward) bias in our sample in the 
event that that some of the excluded emerging markets tended to perform worse (better) than the 
total average in terms of risk-adjusted returns.  However, we are confident that our sample is 
representative enough for the whole emerging market universe since some of the chosen 
                                                          
1
 Oher unit root tests such as Im, Pesaran and Shin W-Stat and PP-Fisher Chi-Square were also used to check for 
across the board consistency.  As expected, we observed that they all reject the null hypothesis at the same stage for 
all of the variables, so we present here only ADF’s results for the sake of brevity.  
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countries have the biggest stock markets among the emerging countries (only China, Taiwan, 
India and Brazil make up more than 55% of the MSCI Emerging Markets Index as of April 28
th
 
2017).  Secondly, stock indices only contain a certain amount of stocks from their respective 
country.  Although these stocks are not usually selected on the basis of their historical or 
expected future performance but of their liquidity and size, they may still signal a good or bad 
past history.  Thus, firms whose size and liquidity are decreasing (or that just go bankrupt) are 
substituted by other firms whose liquidity and size are increasing, which causes index returns to 
be upward biased as we can only look at survivors. 
4. Methodology 
 
For our work, we will use OLS regression analysis on a panel data set.  We will initially run a 
regression on the entire dataset but subsequently we will split our data into two sections -pre- and 
post-crisis-.  The reasoning behind this decision, which has been touched upon already, is that 
capital inflows to emerging markets, specifically portfolio investment, see a dramatic rise in the 
years following the crisis.  Intuitively, we would expect that high volumes of flows of portfolio 
investment capital into emerging markets would have an effect on their stock markets.  
Moreover, Bilson et al. (2001) state that it is possible that reporting delays create a lag between 
the changing variables and the reflection of those on stock returns; therefore, the effect is not 
usually instantaneous.  Instead, it normally takes some time for a change in a variable to have an 
effect on the financial markets and, for that reason Bilson, et al. (2001) base their lag decision on 
the IMF’s Data Dissemination Standards from 1997.  Hence, in order to gauge the proper amount 
of lags that we should implement in our models, we follow this same method but using the IMF’s 
General Data Dissemination System (GDDS) from 2013.  According to this guide, we use the 
second lag of the growth in real activity, the first lag of the growth in the consumer price index 
and in the money supply and the current observation of the exchange rate change.  Regarding the 
dividend yield and price-to-earnings ratio, we use the current observation since, as shown in the 
correlation matrix, there is a high level of persistence in these series; therefore, the current 
observation already includes much of the information of the previous lags and including them 
may give rise to multicollinearity issues.  As noted in the data section, we carried out a panel 
ADF test in order to make sure that all of our variables are stationary and, therefore, we would 
not experience the issues associated with unit roots.  The model we build is as follows: 
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𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝑅𝑤𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝛥𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝛽3𝛥𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝛥𝑀𝑆𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝛥𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐷𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡
+ +𝛽8𝑀𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝑀𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝜆𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
where SRit denotes the Sharpe ratio as originally described in Sharpe (1966) as  
 
𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡  =  
𝑅𝑖𝑡 −  𝑅𝑓𝑖𝑡
𝜎𝑅𝑖𝑡
 
  
where Rit stands for the monthly returns and Rfit is monthly risk-free rate proxied by the three-
month treasury bills in each country except for China, Russia and Turkey where the deposit rate 
has been used, for Argentina and Peru where the money market rate is used, for Indonesia where 
the 3-month JIBOR is used and for Chile where the 90-365 day lending rate is used instead, due 
to a lack of availability of data.  For standard deviation -𝜎𝑅-, we are using a rolling 36-month 
standard deviation starting from September 1997.  The world returns are represented by Rwit and 
proxied by the MSCI world index, ΔRAit is the real activity growth proxied by the industrial 
production growth, ΔMSit is the money supply growth (M1), ΔERit is the exchange rate change 
measured as dollars per unit of local currency, ΔCPIit is the consumer price index and Mit is the 
momentum.  The final two variables are micro in nature; DYit is the dividend yield while PEit is 
the price-to-earnings ratio.  The dummy variables for the cross-sectional fixed effects are 
represented by 𝜆𝑖. 
 
The reason to only include up to two lags in the first model is that, in our belief, and as is 
confirmed by the IMF (2013), new economic information is usually priced in the financial market 
quite quickly and, consequently, up to two months should be an appropriate amount of time for 
prices to reflect relevant information.  In fact, as mentioned in the literature review, the selection 
of variables is subject to some arbitrariness and subjectivity which cannot be avoided, for this 
reason, we based our decision about selecting these specific variables on their success in previous 
papers. 
 
Furthermore, we expect to have heterogeneity in our dataset as there is usually some 
dependence among different countries’ financial markets and over time.  Therefore, a pooled 
regression will lead to a loss of information and incorrect results.  In order to begin to tackle this 
issue, we use a Hausman test so as to investigate whether random effects or fixed effects are 
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appropriate in our model, both for the entire sample and for the pre- and post-crisis subsets.  
However, we observe that, for the model explained above, we cannot perform this test due the 
lack of cross-sectional variability in the world returns variable, which leads to a misleading 
Hausman test p-value of 1 for the cross-sectional dimension due to this lack of variance.  Besides, 
this does not allow us to implement fixed effect in the period dimension either.  As a result, we 
use fixed effects for the cross-sectional dimension in order to address the expected heterogeneity, 
since it is more used in practice as weaker assumptions are necessary to correctly implement 
them.  Hence, a fixed-effects (for the cross-section dimension) none (for the period dimension) 
model is built, keeping in mind that a time trend, if any, will be captured by the coefficient of the 
world returns.  Similar results are found for the pre- and post- crisis models. 
 
We also use robust standard errors by implementing the White (diagonal) method in order to 
address the potential problem of heteroscedasticity in our models. Furthermore, we look at the 
Durbin-Watson test in the entire-period model, pre-crisis model and post-crisis model, in order to 
make sure that we can rule out the presence of serial correlation and that our models are well-
specified and free of errors.  The results for the whole-period model, the pre-crisis model and the 
post-crisis model are 2.016, 2.096 and 2.012, respectively.  The upper critical value for 10 
regressors and a sample size of, at least, 200 observations is 1.779, so we can safely fail to reject 
the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation in our models.  A non-linearity test has also been 
performed by plotting a scatter graph of our independent variable against the dependent variables 
and no evidence of non-linearity has been found.  The scatter graphs can be found from the figure 
1 to the figure 8 in the appendix.   
 
We have also performed a Chow test to test for a significant difference in the structure of the 
data when comparing two subsets, one either side of the initial date of the crisis, in an attempt to 
corroborate our belief that there is a change in the data after the 2007/08 financial crisis. 
 
𝑅𝑆𝑆 − (𝑅𝑆𝑆1 + 𝑅𝑆𝑆2)
𝑅𝑆𝑆1 + 𝑅𝑆𝑆2
∗
𝑇 − 2𝑘
𝑘
~ 𝐹(𝑘, 𝑇 − 2𝑘) 
 
H0: The relationship does not change 
H1: There is a structural break 
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Where RSS stands for the residual sum of squares for the whole sample regression, RSS1 for 
the pre-crisis regression, RSS2 for the post-crisis regression, T is the number of observations 
altogether and k is the number of regressors.  The results for the F-statistic and the critical value 
at an α = 0.001 are 11.18 and 2.96, respectively.  As a consequence, we reject the null hypothesis 
that risk-adjusted returns were governed by the same relationship before and after the financial 
crisis.  This reinforces our intuition that there is a significant change in the structure of the data 
around the time of the crisis and that inspection of subsections is necessary. 
 
Once the regression results have been obtained properly, we will look at the p-values in order 
to infer whether the explanatory variables investigated in the paper are significant or not, as well 
as at their coefficient signs and magnitudes to find out if the effect is positive or negative and 
whether they are economically significant.  Furthermore, we find quite interesting to investigate 
whether either the pre- or post- crisis model fits the actual observations better than the other, 
since this may tell us that risk-adjusted returns used to be or have become more predictable.  As 
explained in the data section, our argument follows the narrative that increased capital flows have 
had a significant impact on the stock markets of emerging nations.  These flows would have had 
a positive impact but this does not mean that we are arguing that risk-adjusted returns were 
superior in the post crisis period, but that one influence has become more dominant in 
determining the levels of these returns.  As a result, we expect to be able to better explain our 
dependent variable in our model for the post-crisis period.  To test this, we have performed an F-
test: 
 
𝐹(𝑑𝑓1, 𝑑𝑓2) =
(𝑅𝑆𝑆1 − 𝑅𝑆𝑆2)/(𝑑𝑓1 − 𝑑𝑓2)
𝑅𝑆𝑆2/𝑑𝑓2
 
 
H0: Model 1 (post-crisis) is better than model 2 (pre-crisis) 
H1: Model 2 (pre-crisis) is better than model 1 (post-crisis) 
 
Where RSS1 and RSS2 are the residual sum of squares of the post- and pre-crisis models, 
respectively and the df1 and df2 represent the degrees of freedom for the first model and second 
model (post-crisis and pre-crisis), respectively calculated as N-k, where N is the total amount of 
observations in the model and k the number of parameters estimated.  The null hypothesis is that 
model one is better than model two, therefore, should we observe a p-value smaller than 0.05, 
 
19 
 
then we could assert that the pre-crisis model fits the actual risk-adjusted returns better than the 
post-crisis model, and vice versa. 
 
Lastly, we will also make use of a Granger Causality test, which will help us to see ifthe 
effect is being producedin a one-way or two-way direction.  Granger´s concept of causality is 
defined as: “X is said to Granger cause Y if Y can be predicted with a greater accuracy by using 
past values of X” (Kahu and Sahu, 2009, p. 282), and vice versa.  We consider the following 
equation: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑌𝑡−2 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑋𝑡−2 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
Hence, we can say that X Granger causes Y if β3 and β4 ≠ 0, which can be tested with a 
standard F-test for joint significance.  In our case, we will use two lags to test the causality as we 
believe that this should be enough to cause risk-adjusted returns, although this selection is quite 
arbitrary.  Consequently, by running this test, we expect to shed more light on whether the actual 
relationship between risk-adjusted returns and macroeconomic and microeconomic variables is 
produced in a one-way or two-way direction.  However, we should keep in mind that the Granger 
causality test does not account for potential confounding effects, so a third variable may actually 
be the source of the causality.  Furthermore, it does not capture instantaneous relationships 
between the variables either, while we would expect to see some instantaneous effects coming 
from, for example, the exchange rate, the dividend yield and the price-to-earnings ratio. 
5. Empirical Results 
 
In this section we present the results that we obtained from our analysis.  The first step is to 
build the three regression models shown in Table 1 for the periods between September 2000 and 
September 2016 (whole period), September 2000 and September 2007 (pre-crisis) and October 
2007 and September 2016 (post-crisis).  The OLS method was applied to each of the three 
models, and the standard errors were adjusted for heteroscedasticity by using the White Diagonal 
method. 
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Table 1: Regression Results 
Model/Coefficient 2000-2016 Pre-Crisis (2000-07) Post-Crisis (2007-16) 
𝛼 
 
0.107235*** 
(2.729696) 
 
0.184512*** 
(3.232106) 
 
-0.056257 
(-0.691163) 
 
𝑅𝑤𝑖𝑡 
 
10.70468*** 
(26.42199) 
 
10.24999*** 
(18.29693) 
 
10.75395*** 
(22.29316) 
 
𝛥𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑡−2 
 
-0.512624* 
(-1.787343) 
 
-0.909302** 
(-2.314186) 
 
-0.224616 
(-0.559635) 
 
𝛥𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 
 
-4.714434** 
(-2.480619) 
 
-4.433294* 
(-1.671895) 
 
-5.895627** 
(-2.124081) 
 
𝛥𝑀𝑆𝑖𝑡−1 
 
1.618027*** 
(3.144188) 
 
2.770921*** 
(4.200352) 
 
-0.190630 
(-0.261697) 
 
𝛥𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 
 
3.029069*** 
(3.258803) 
 
1.928467 
(1.324733) 
 
3.740633*** 
(5.279181) 
 
𝐷𝑌𝑖𝑡 
 
-0.032784*** 
(-2.833968) 
 
-0.030176 
(-1.559499) 
 
-0.019131 
(-1.062842) 
 
𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 
 
0.001236*** 
(3.307540) 
 
0.001091*** 
(2.640227) 
 
0.005828* 
(1.863169) 
 
𝑀𝑖𝑡−1 
 
0.078034 
(0.382957) 
 
0.119880 
(0.384002) 
 
-0.225279 
(-0.932544) 
 
𝑀𝑖𝑡−2 
 
0.133904 
(0.732824) 
 
0.097016 
(0.373862) 
 
-0.122473 
(-0.489509) 
 
Observations 3667 1615 2052 
R
2
adj 0.323860 0.234643 0.388015 
F-test 66.03546 19.32665 49.16260 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
The first thing we observe is that the constant term turns out to be significant and positive in 
the whole-period model and in the pre-crisis model.  This implies that a superior risk-adjusted 
excess return is constantly obtained over these periods above and beyond that which is explained 
by the other variables in the model, which is unrealistic as, in efficient markets, abnormal returns 
are infrequent and hard to obtain.  Consequently, this means that there may be other factors 
explaining risk-adjusted returns which have not been included in our models or that emerging 
markets have not been completely efficient, giving rise to the possibility of obtaining abnormal 
returns.  Interestingly, we do not observe the same result for the post-crisis period, which 
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suggests that emerging equity markets have become more efficient or that our explanatory 
variables are better at predicting risk-adjusted returns in this period. 
 
With respect to the individual variable coefficients, we observe that there is more significance 
across the board in the model for the entire period.  The principal reason for this may be that the 
entire-sample regression draws information from roughly twice as many observations as the other 
two models, which makes the coefficients estimated more accurate.  The world returns variable is 
positive, and both highly statistically and economically significant in every case; this is to be 
expected as this variable captures the time varying dimension of the variation in risk-adjusted 
returns since, as explained in the methodology section, the world returns do not vary by country 
and, therefore, we cannot account for time-variability by using fixed effects.  Consequently, we 
observe that there seems to be a positive time trend over our sample period due to this high, 
positive and very significant coefficient. 
 
For the model covering the entire sample period we have the coefficient on the twice lagged 
change in real activity variable negative and statistically significant at the 10% level.  This almost 
counterintuitive result could be a consequence of the theories discussed in our literature review 
with respect to papers by Fama and French (1989) and Goetzmann et al. (2012), who postulate 
that expected returns are higher under poor economic circumstances and vice versa in order to 
encourage investment.  So our results reinforce this hypothesis and also show that not only do 
expected returns become higher under poor economic conditions, but also risk-adjusted returns 
do.  The coefficient on the lagged change in CPI variable is negative and significant at the 5% 
level.  This is likely due to the fact that high inflation is synonymous with high interest rates as 
governments will generally use monetary policy through the manipulation of interest rates to try 
to control inflation.  Interest rates are included as a component of our dependant variable in the 
numerator of the Sharpe Ratio with a negative sign as a part of the risk premium, and so higher 
interest rates are associated with lower risk-adjusted returns.  Working alongside this factor, 
entities and investors lending to the government in periods of higher inflation will demand a 
higher rate of nominal return to maintain a similar level of real return on the money that they 
lend.  However, we observe that an increase of one standard deviation in inflation only increases 
the Sharpe Ratio by about 4% of its standard deviation, so we can say that this effect is not very 
economically significant.  The positive and highly significant coefficient on the one period 
lagged change in money supply also makes sense economically as an increase in the supply of 
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money in the economy through, for example, a government stimulus package will naturally raise 
the prices on the stock market and therefore the risk-adjusted returns.  However, this result is not 
necessarily in line with the results of previous research on excess returns, as Bilson et al. (2001) 
find that money supply is only significant in five out of twenty emerging countries from February 
1985 to December 1997.  This dissimilarity may well be due to either the difference in the sample 
period or the use of risk-adjusted returns instead of only excess returns as dependent variable.  
We can think that an increase in the money supply in the whole system not only increases stock 
returns as more money is invested in the financial markets, but also lowers volatility.  As shown 
by Giot (2005), the effect of returns on volatility is asymmetric, with lower volatility in periods 
of positive returns, which would explain the fact that money supply becomes more significant 
and with a higher coefficient when trying to explain risk-adjusted returns.  Nonetheless, we also 
find the effect is not economically significant as one standard deviation of the money supply only 
leads to an increase in the Sharpe Ratio by 5% of its standard deviation.  As for the change in the 
exchange rate, we also observe a positive and highly significant coefficient which we believe can 
be explained by the level of capital flowing into the economy, some of which is destined for the 
stock market, pushing the price of stocks up as well as appreciating the exchange rate.  To us, this 
is one of the most interesting variables due to our theories about capital flows and the way the 
exchange rate variable behaves in each of our models.  This result is in line with those found by 
Al-Jafari et al. (2011) for a number of emerging markets and also by Acikalin et al. (2008) for the 
Istanbul stock exchange.  Once more, we see that its effect is not economically significant, as a 
variation of one standard deviation in the exchange rate only sparks a variation of one-tenth 
standard deviations in the Sharpe ratio. 
 
Moving on to the micro factors, dividend yield has a highly significant and negative 
coefficient, which is inconsistent with Fama and French (1989), however their specific findings 
are less relatable so our work as they focussed their analysis purely on the U.S.  On the other 
hand, our findings here are consistent with the results of Bilson et al. (2001), who find their 
coefficient on dividend yield to be significant for ten out of the twenty countries they analyse 
and, in all cases of significance, the coefficient is negative.  However, it is important to note that 
the size of the coefficient is very small and economically insignificant when looking at the 
proportional effect on the value of the Sharpe Ratio.  The price-to-earnings ratio is also highly 
significant but with a positive coefficient.  This is also consistent with the Bilson et al. (2001) 
findings, where they have a positive coefficient, significant at the 5% level in 16 out of 20 cases.  
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However, our coefficient on the price-to-earnings ratio is clearly economically insignificant 
again, having a very marginal effect on our dependant variable per unit increase in the PE ratio.  
Momentum is represented by the last two variables, the one and two period lags of returns, 
respectively.  In both cases we fail to find any statistically significant results, which means that 
we should not expect to see higher or lower risk-adjusted returns today based on a positive or 
negative return in the two previous months.  We think this result can have some implications for 
the momentum investment strategies that some investors follow, as it shows that no actual reward 
(adjusted for risk) is offered in upward trending emerging stock markets. 
 
The output of the regressions resulting from the splitting of the data into our two subsections 
differs drastically, as is to be expected.  Looking at the pre-crisis period we can see that, as 
mentioned above in this section, the world returns variable retains its statistical and economic 
significance.  However, we should keep in mind that this coefficient is capturing the time-varying 
effects in the model.  Both the lagged change in the money supply and the price to earnings ratio 
also remain significant at the 1% level.  However, while the coefficient on the price-to-earnings 
ratio only changes marginally in magnitude, the coefficient on the money supply increases 
significantly.  This clearly indicates that the strong positive value of the coefficient in the model 
for the whole period is derived from the pre-crisis period.  Nonetheless, it still remains 
economically insignificant.  Both the significance and the coefficient increase (in absolute terms) 
for the twice-lagged change in real activity, while for the lagged change in CPI the significance 
level drops to 10% and the coefficient drops slightly in absolute terms.  Both the change in the 
exchange rate and the dividend yield value fall from significance at the 1% level to no statistical 
significance to speak of whatsoever while momentum remains insignificant.  From our point of 
view, the fact that the exchange rate coefficient becomes insignificant in the pre-crisis period has 
to do with the higher money supply coefficient, since the countries’ own monetary mass  
becomes more relevant to drive stock prices in the absence of powerful forces (capital flows) 
coming from abroad. 
 
For the post-crisis period, again the world returns are positive and highly statistically and 
economically significant.  Therefore, world returns explain a large proportion of risk-adjusted 
returns also after the 2007/08 financial crisis but, largely, due to the time-varying effects of the 
model.  Furthermore, the change in the real activity loses its significance although its coefficient 
remains negative.  This still backs up the theory that real activity should have a negative impact, 
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if any, on the stock market; however, as we have already stated over the paper, we believe that 
other variables have played a more important role in driving the stock market behaviour in 
emerging markets.  One of these variables is, obviously, the exchange rate.  The results in our 
post-crisis model supports the theory that capital flows have been the main driver of stock prices 
thanks to the substantial increase in net inflows, especially when it comes to portfolio investment 
flows.  Thus, we observe an exchange rate coefficient which is larger and more significant than in 
the other two models, which signals that money coming from abroad was invested in equities.  At 
the same time, we observe that the mean rolling 36-month standard deviation has the lowest 
value among the three samples, which leads to higher risk-adjusted returns and may have also 
been sparked by these rising flows of money.  Nonetheless, we still see that this effect remains 
somewhat insignificant in economic terms as one standard deviation move in the exchange rate 
only leads to an increase of about 13% of a standard deviation in the Sharpe ratio.  We also 
observe that, as with real activity, the money supply becomes statistically insignificant in the 
post-crisis period.  We, again, argue that the emerging countries’ own monetary mass relevance 
has become dwarfed in the presence of the huge financial assets purchases by foreigners.  
Regarding the inflation effect, we see that it has become more negative after the crisis while 
remaining significant at a 5% level as in the pre-crisis model.  This may well also be explained by 
the capital inflows surge.  Capital inflows create inflation in the assets of the receptor country, 
which may have led to stronger efforts from the central banks in order to keep it under control 
and, in turn, given rise to higher interest rates and lower risk-adjusted excess returns.  Still, the 
inflation effect continues to be economically insignificant. 
 
As for the microeconomic variables, we see that the dividend yield turns out to be completely 
statistically insignificant while the price-to-earnings ratio becomes significant only at a 10% level 
(vs. 1% in the pre-crisis period).  Furthermore, although we observe that the coefficient of the 
latter is five times larger now; its effect remains largely insignificant as it shows a much smaller 
standard deviation in this period.  As we believe, and other studies already mentioned show, 
emerging markets have become more dominated by foreign investors in the last decade, and the 
fact that the dividend yield does not have a statistically significant effect shows that investors 
may have become more concerned about other factors when investing in emerging markets.  
Perhaps, it may indicate that they are not paying any attention to fundamental variables when 
moving their money into these markets.  Moreover, the fact that the explanatory power of the 
post-crisis model increases dramatically seems to be mostly driven by the higher significance of 
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the exchange rate variable since, on the other hand, other variables become completely irrelevant 
or with a lower t-statistic. 
 
We are primarily interested in investigating if there is any statistically significant difference 
between the pre-crisis and post-crisis models.  The aforementioned F-test gives us a result of 0.90 
with a critical value near 1 and a p-value of 0.96, so we can safely conclude that the post-crisis 
model fits the actual Sharpe ratio observations better than the pre-crisis model and, consequently, 
it has a higher predictive power.  We find this result quite interesting as, essentially, it draws that 
risk-adjusted returns have become more predictable through our chosen variables after the crisis 
period.  As observed in the regression results and mentioned above, one of the main differences 
between the pre- and post-crisis periods is the coefficient of the exchange rate variable, which 
becomes 94% larger in size and with a t-statistic 62% greater.  As we initially thought, and our 
results back up, the capital flows seem to have played a key role in driving the prices in emerging 
equity markets up to the point that our post-crisis model better statistically predicts the risk-
adjusted returns. 
 
In order to carry our investigation further, we have also performed a Granger causality test so as 
to find whether the direction of the effect of our regressors is actually produced from these 
variables to our dependent variable. The results are shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Granger Causality Test 
Model/F-statistic 2000-2016 Pre-Crisis (2000-07) Post-Crisis (2007-16) 
𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡 → 𝑅𝑤𝑖𝑡 18.93*** 5.260*** 16.12*** 
𝑅𝑤𝑖𝑡 → 𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡 16.92*** 23.28*** 8.087*** 
𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡 → 𝛥𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑡−2 2.168 1.342 2.106 
𝛥𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑡−2 → 𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡 0.00554 0.2739 0.3182 
𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡 → 𝛥𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 0.8325 1.904 1.729 
𝛥𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 → 𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡 1.880 0.6621 1.941 
𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡 → 𝛥𝑀𝑆𝑖𝑡−1 5.317*** 6.196*** 0.08245 
𝛥𝑀𝑆𝑖𝑡−1 → 𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡 0.07312 3.244** 0.9768 
𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡 → 𝛥𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 6.675*** 1.279 4.838*** 
𝛥𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 → 𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡 4.202** 0.8461 4.455** 
𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡 → 𝐷𝑌𝑖𝑡 28.32*** 1.698 39.49*** 
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𝐷𝑌𝑖𝑡 → 𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡 9.165*** 6.349*** 8.014*** 
𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡 → 𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 1.085 1.460 3.250** 
𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 → 𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡 1.303 1.397 2.125 
𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡 → 𝑀𝑖𝑡−1 11541.8*** 4474.5*** 7495.5*** 
𝑀𝑖𝑡−1 → 𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡 10.02*** 5.427*** 4.530** 
𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡 → 𝑀𝑖𝑡−2 11505.6*** 4483.1*** 7493.1*** 
𝑀𝑖𝑡−2 → 𝑆𝑅𝑖𝑡 9.53*** 2.035 7.652*** 
Observations 3667 1615 2052 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
In general the results of the Granger causality tests for each of our variables are mixed with 
regards to comparison with our regressions but support the changes which we are most interested 
in.  The Sharpe ratio and the world returns are caused in a both-way relationship and this is 
highly significant in all cases as it was in our regression analysis.  The reason for this may be 
because the environment in the world markets as a whole clearly affects the emerging market, 
and emerging markets make up a portion of the world returns; consequently, it is normal to 
observe a two-way effect.  We should also remember that the coefficient of the world returns is 
capturing a potential time trend in the dataset, which could also affect this result.  The 
relationship between the twice-lagged change in real activity variable and the Sharpe Ratio was 
significant for the whole and pre-crisis period models at the 10% and 5% level respectively in the 
regression analysis, but has no significant causality in either direction according to the Granger 
tests.  Similarly, the lagged change in CPI variable was significant in all three models at the 5% 
level for the whole period and post-crisis period and 10% for the pre-crisis period, whereas there 
is no significant causality found.  For the lagged money supply variable we observe results 
comparable with our set of regressions, the causality in the direction from money supply to SR is 
significant for the pre-crisis period at the 5% level, but not at all in the post-crisis period.  
Moreover, we observe a two-way relationship for the pre-crisis period, which means that the 
market behaviour in emerging markets may have had an effect on the monetary policies of the 
central banks from these countries over this period but not after the crisis.  This reinforces our 
view that because of the increased power of other variables in explaining SR post-crisis 
compared with pre-crisis, the change in money supply loses its significance.  In line with this 
theory are the results for the change in the exchange rate variable’s causality on the SR, which is 
significant at the 5% level post-crisis but not at all pre-crisis, just as the coefficient is significant 
at the 1% level post-crisis but not pre-crisis in our regression analysis.  This follows from our 
 
27 
 
theory that the increased proportion of rises in risk-adjusted returns caused by an influx of capital 
flows for portfolio investment gives the exchange rate variable increased explanatory power at 
the expense of other variables.  Unsurprisingly, we also see that the stock returns affected the 
exchange rate just in the periods when exchange rate affected stock returns (two-way 
relationship).  This may imply that, when foreign investors are interested in investing in emerging 
equity markets, they take the previous stock returns into account in order to decide whether to 
invest or not, so they are both caused simultaneously. 
 
The causality of the dividend yield variable on the SR is significant at the 1% level for all 
models, whereas the coefficient is significant at the 1% for the whole model but not at all pre- or 
post-crisis in our regression analysis.  We also find that they are both caused in a simultaneous 
relationship in the whole sample and the post-crisis period as, probably, higher returns lead to a 
lower dividend yield, at least, in the short-run.  Similarly, we find contradicting results for the 
price-to-earnings ratio, which is significant at the 1%, 1% and 10% level for the whole period, 
pre-crisis period and post-crisis period respectively in the regression analysis, whereas there is no 
causality from PE to SR.  When looking at momentum, we observe a big difference in the results 
of the causality tests and the regression results. According to our panel data model, there is no 
correlation at all between the risk-adjusted returns and the two past returns observed; however, 
the Granger causality indicates a strong causality from the latter to the former. 
 
It is important to remember that, as explained in the methodology section, the Granger 
causality test does not account for confounded effects; hence, there might be other variables 
inducing the causality indirectly and whose effects can be controlled more appropriately in a 
regression model.  Furthermore, a causality test only takes into account previous lags whereas we 
are only looking at the current time signature in the regressions for some of the explanatory 
variables.  It is also noteworthy that dividend yield and price-to-earnings variables are highly 
persistent and that this may give rise to misleading results in a causality test that takes into 
account a several lags.  Some readers may criticise this choice and say that first differences 
should be used instead in order to avoid this issue.  However, the reality is that we are interested 
in how the dividend yield itself Granger causes stock returns as, in practice, investors look more 
at its level rather than at how it changes, although we must be careful when interpreting the 
results of this causality test. 
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6. Conclusions 
 
The research on the influence of a combination of macro and microeconomic variables on 
excess returns in emerging markets is extremely limited and the application of a multifactor 
model of this nature in the case of risk-adjusted returns was, up until now, yet to be investigated.  
In producing this piece of work, our intention was not only to search for meaningful results, but 
also to provide a point of reference for future investigation in this area. 
 
Our research has yielded some interesting results, with aspects both confirming and 
contradicting findings from previous literature.  However, it is important that when looking at the 
comparisons that are made between findings in our paper and previous papers, that we compare 
with work focussed on excess returns.  This discrepancy could potentially explain some of the 
differences, but we believe that these comparisons are still useful to gain some insight. 
 
We believe that the structural break found in our data due to changing world markets’ 
dynamics was, at least, partially due to increased capital flows into emerging markets.  Indeed, 
our results go some way to confirming this theory.  Firstly, when performing the F-test to 
calculate which model achieved a better fit to the data, it was found that the post-crisis model 
significantly outperforms the pre-crisis model.  When looking at the changes in variables’ 
significance and coefficient signs and magnitudes, we find some interesting characteristics.  We 
were particularly interested in how the features of the change in exchange rate variable differed 
between the two subset models as this variable can be seen to partially represent capital flows.  
The exchange rate variable was insignificant in the pre-crisis model with a coefficient of 1.92 and 
a t-stat of 1.32.  When we compare this with the post-crisis period, we see that the coefficient has 
almost doubled, and now is 3.74 and the t-stat has increased to 5.28, making the coefficient 
statistically significant at the 1% level.  The variable was also highly significant in the model for 
the entire sample period (but with a lower t-stat of 3.26). 
 
On the other hand, when looking at a movement from the pre-crisis to the post-crisis period, 
the second lag of the change in real activity, first lag of the change in money supply variable lost 
their significance and the price to earnings ratio fell from being significant at the 1% level to just 
the 10% level.  A plausible explanation for this is that the influx of foreign cash into the 
economies increased the exchange rate from the home country’s point of view.  At the same time, 
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this new foreign money dominated the equity market, compared with the effects of the above-
mentioned domestic variables.  The effects of changes in real activity and the money supply on 
the stock market in the post-crisis period begin to seem insignificant when compared with the 
amounts of money that was flowing in from other countries.  Additionally, we find that the 
change in goods prices always has a significant and negative effect on risk-adjusted returns, 
which becomes even more intense after the global financial crisis.  Nonetheless, we find that 
none of these variables have a high impact on risk-adjusted returns, economically speaking. 
 
As Bilson et al. (2001) observed for their sample period, the micro factors, dividend yield and 
price-to-earnings ratio were significant and they argue that their findings indicate these micro 
factors are the most prevalent.  In our case, these variables were also significant for the entire 
period; however, most of this explanatory power was lost when looking at the post-crisis period, 
which could possibly be due to the same suggested reason for the macroeconomic variables.  
Regardless, in all cases the economic significance of the coefficients was practically negligible 
again.  Furthermore, our Granger causality test helped us see that some variables, such as the 
money supply, exchange rate, dividend yield and momentum, are or have been determined in a 
two-way causal relationship at some point in the sample, which sheds some more light on how 
these variables are affected.  For example, from this we can infer that foreign investors also pay 
attention to the past behaviour of emerging equity markets when making a decision on investing 
in them, which gives rise to the observed two-way relationship between risk-adjusted returns and 
exchange rate. 
 
All in all, from our research and analysis, we find that not only do the individual variable 
coefficients change in significance and magnitude when comparing pre- and post-crisis results, 
but also the overall fit and explanatory power of the models indicate that the post-crisis model is 
superior.  Therefore the explicability of risk-adjusted returns in emerging markets has increased 
in the wake of the global financial crisis which, from our perspective, can be perfectly explained 
by the large amount of money coming into emerging economies from developed countries.  We 
believe that these results may be useful for the decision-making process of investors and 
policymakers when it comes to strategic asset allocation and the implementation of economic 
policies to keep the financial markets under control.  On the other hand, as exposed at the 
beginning of the paper, we leave for further research the use of other volatility measures, such as 
a G(ARCH) model, and of other risk-adjusted measures which might lead to a deeper conclusion.  
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In addition, other global factors can be added to the model to test whether they can improve the 
fit of a similar model. 
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Appendix 
Table 3: Summary statistics 
Period/Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
      
Whole sample (2000m09-2016m09) 
SR 3667 0.032638 0.963124 -4.755720 3.272278 
Rw 3667 0.001159 0.045614 -0.210619 0.103493 
RA 3667 0.002464 0.044027 -0.373288 0.283286 
INF 3667 0.004189 0.007857 -0.039250 0.098837 
MS 3667 0.010866 0.030292 -0.195785 0.282382 
ER 3667 -0.001860 0.034209 -0.663689 0.181444 
DY 3667 3.023182 1.667220 0.140000 13.80000 
PE 3667 15.97670 25.63391 -33.15000 1000.000 
Momentum 3667 0.007089 0.073728 -0.466485 0.432783 
      
 
Pre-crisis period (2000m09-2007m09) 
SR 1615 0.159342 0.902495 -2.733697 3.272278 
Rw 1615 0.001986 0.038767 -0.117937 0.082858 
RA 1615 0.003700 0.045606 -0.285015 0.285015 
INF 1615 0.004522 0.008279 -0.019478 0.098837 
MS 1615 0.013041 0.033614 -0.154020 0.282382 
ER 1615 0.000552 0.034244 -0.663689 0.181444 
DY 1615 2.694359 1.650682 0.140000 13.80000 
PE 1615 17.41766 37.71054 2.400000 1000.000 
Momentum 1615 0.014656 0.073996 -0.436745 0.432783 
      
 
Post-crisis period (2007m10-2016m09) 
SR 2052 -0.067083 0.997237 -4.755720 2.969633 
Rw 2052 0.000508 0.050353 -0.210619 0.103493 
RA 2052 0.001492 0.042730 -0.373288 0.212868 
INF 2052 0.003927 0.007499 -0.039250 0.091879 
MS 2052 0.009155 0.027283 -0.195785 0.208939 
ER 2052 -0.003759 0.034071 -0.289300 0.124752 
DY 2052 3.281979 1.634628 0.400000 13.00000 
PE 2052 14.84261 7.245779 -33.15000 59.10000 
Momentum 2052 0.001135 0.072984 -0.466485 0.325410 
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Table 4: Summary statistics for index returns, interest rates and 36-month rolling std. dev. 
Period/Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
      
Whole sample (2000m09-2016m09) 
Monthly returns 3667 0.007089 0.073728 -0.466485 0.432783 
Monthly ST int. 
rates 
3667 0.005961 0.006822 -0.000138 0.100217 
Rolling 36-
month std. dev. 
3667 0.073582 0.030331 0.020209 0.230106 
 
Pre-crisis period (2000m09-2007m09) 
Monthly returns 1615 0.014656 0.073996 -0.436745 0.432783 
Monthly ST int. 
rates 
1615 0.006860 0.008931 0.000608 0.100217 
Rolling 36-
month std. dev. 
1615 0.073996 0.033425 0.029178 0.230106 
 
Post-crisis period (2007m10-2016m09) 
Monthly returns 2052 0.001135 0.072984 -0.466485 0.325410 
Monthly ST int. 
rates 
2052 0.005253 0.004391 -0.000138 0.048600 
Rolling 36-
month std. dev. 
2052 0.068644 0.026642 0.020209 0.142224 
 
 
Table 5: Correlation Matrix 
 RW RA(-2) INF(-1) MS(-1) ER DY PE M (-1) M (-2) 
RW 1.0000 0.0388 0.0014 0.0018 0.3934 -0.0467 -0.0218 0.1380 0.0486 
RA(-2) 0.0388 1.0000 -0.0014 0.0276 0.0026 -0.0377 0.0118 0.0296 0.0092 
INF(-1) 0.0014 -0.0014 1.0000 0.0203 -0.0937 -0.0854 0.0503 0.0155 0.0389 
MS(-1) 0.0018 0.0276 0.0203 1.0000 -0.0510 -0.0512 0.0274 0.0169 0.0643 
ER 0.3934 0.0026 -0.0937 -0.0510 1.0000 -0.0470 -0.0269 0.0774 -0.0076 
DY -0.0467 -0.0377 -0.0854 -0.0512 -0.0470 1.0000 -0.1053 -0.0810 -0.0849 
PE -0.0218 0.0118 0.0503 0.0274 -0.0269 -0.1053 1.0000 -0.0069 -0.0036 
M(-1) 0.1380 0.0296 0.0155 0.0169 0.0774 -0.0810 -0.0069 1.0000 0.0921 
 
35 
 
M(-2) 0.0486 0.0092 0.0389 0.0643 -0.0076 -0.0849 -0.0036 0.0921 1.0000 
 
Table 6: Correlation matrix cont. 
 DY DY(-1) DY(-2) PE PE(-1) PE(-2) 
DY  1.0000  0.9599  0.9238 -0.1053 -0.1042 -0.1027 
DY(-1)  0.9599  1.0000  0.9598 -0.0986 -0.1064 -0.1054 
DY(-2)  0.9238  0.9598  1.0000 -0.0939 -0.0998 -0.1077 
PE -0.1053 -0.0986 -0.0939  1.0000  0.7137  0.3996 
PE(-1) -0.1042 -0.1064 -0.0998  0.7137  1.0000  0.7138 
PE(-2) -0.1027 -0.1054 -0.1077  0.3996  0.7138  1.0000 
 
 
Table 7: ADF-test p-values   
Variable Intercept and trend Intercept None 
SR 778.754*** - - 
Rw 606.533*** - - 
RA 474.432*** - - 
INF 323.863*** - - 
MS 194.176*** - - 
ER 1026.70*** - - 
DY 101.349*** - - 
PE 176.065*** - - 
Momentum 1203.84*** - - 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively 
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Figure 1: Sharpe Ratio vs. MSCI World Returns 
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Figure 2: Sharpe Ratio vs. ΔReal Activity 
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Figure 3: Sharpe Ratio vs. ΔCPI 
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Figure 4: Sharpe Ratio vs. ΔMoney Supply 
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Figure 5: Sharpe Ratio vs. ΔExchange Rate 
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Figure 6: Sharpe Ratio vs. Dividend Yield 
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Figure 7: Sharpe Ratio vs. Price to Earnings 
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Figure 8: Sharpe Ratio vs. Momentum 
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